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The Anomaly of Payment as an
Affirmative Defense
ALISON REPPYt
I. INTRODUCTION
To the average student of pleading and practice, the origin and
theory of payment as an affirmative defense is not only an anomaly
in name, but also an anomaly in fact. While one eminent author-
ity' seems to think that "According to the course of judicial de-
cisions" the general rules regarding such a defense are clear and
certain and that there is hardly a "dissent" as to the same, an-
other writer, perhaps not so eminent, but at least to be highly re-
spected, remarks: "The authorities are not at one as to whether the
defense of payment is new matter to be specially pleaded, or whether
it may be proved under a general denial."2 The problem has been
touched upon by numerous text-writers, 3 it has been the central
theme of many decisions,4 and of at least one very able opinion.5
tProfessor of Law, New Jersey Law School.1Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4 th ed.), see. 541.2Phillips on Code Pleading, sec. 363.
3Payment as an affirmative defense as treated in the digests and by the text-
writers: (a) Digests: i Dec. Dig., Payment, 63; 2 Cent. Dig., Payment, 158; 2 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 658; 16 L. R.A. (N. S.) 127; 5 Bac. Abr. Pleas and G. T. 2; 36 Am.
Dec. 606; 38 Am. Dec. 594; 43 Am. Dec. 750; 61 Am. Dec. 58; 68 Am. Dec. 620;
69 Am. Dec. 696; 83 Am. Dec. 199; 88 Am. Dec. 396; 12 Am. St. Rep. 414; 82 Am.
St. Rep. 756; i3o Am. St. Rep. 13o; 137 Am. St. Rep. 912. (b) Text-writers:
A Cyc. 353; 30 Cyc. 1251; 21 R. C. L., sec. 127; Abbot's Trial Brief (2d ed.), vol.
ii, ch. xviii, see. 365, p. 1535, n. 6, p. 1538; x6 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 164; 22 Am.&
Eng. Enc. P1. & Pr. 513; Bliss on Code P1. (3d ed.), sees. 357, 357 n. 124, 126,
358, 358 n. 128; I Chitty on P1. & Pr. (Ist Am. ed.), vol. iii, p. 687; Chitty on
Bills, x98; Chitty on P1. (16th Am. ed.), vol. i, pp. 504,505,511, 514,756; 3 Cooley's
B. 3o3; Greenleaf on Evidence (15th ed.), vol. ii, p. 516; Hepburn's Development
of The Code, sees. 285-291; Lawes on Pl. sees. 520 & 521; Maxwell's Code P1.
8, 497; Phillips on Code P1., sees. 349, 363, 437; Phillips on Evidence (5th Am.
ed.), vol. i, 657, 825; Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4 th ed.), sees. 535, 541, 569,
570, 572, 577, 658, 659, 776; Stephen's Common Law P1. (2d ed.), p. 58, 418;
Will's Gould on P1. div. v, ch. I, p. 499, 499n.4Collection of American & English cases: (a) American cases by states or juris-
dictions: Alabama: Pollak v. Winter, 166 Ala. 255 (i9io). Arkansas: Jarvis v.
Andrews, 8o Ark. 277 (19o6). California: Frish v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 (1862);
Davanay v. Eggenhoff, 43 Cal. 395 (1872). Colorado: Bartholomew v. Emerson-
Brantingham Implement Co., 68 Colo. 244 (1920). Connecticut: Elm City Lum-
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In view of this divergence of opinion on the part of the authorities,
plus the fact that the question has been before the courts on so many
occasions, and is of constant recurrence, it might not be inappro-
priate to make of it a new study. This should be done, not so much
in the hope of adding any new thought, as to collect and arrange in
some comprehensive and systematic manner the most important
material on the subject, to attempt an explanation of the anomaly,
to work out the different situations which have been evolved thru
variations from the general rule, and to draw, from an analysis of the
cases, a conclusion as to whether such a defense ought to be abolished,
or whether, despite the anomaly connected therewith, it should be
retained as a matter of sound policy. 6
ber Co. v. McKenzie, 77 Conn. I (19o4). Delaware: Klair v. Phila., B. & W.
Railroad Co., 2 Boyce 274 (19io). Florida: International Harvester Co. of Am-
erica v. Smith, 51 Fla. 220 (19o6). Georgia: Dickson v. Wainwright, 137 Ga.
299 (191I). Idaho: First National Bank v. Bews, 3 Idaho 486 (1892). Illinois:
Crews v. Bleakley, 16 Ill. 21 (1854). Indiana: Hubler v. Pullen, 9 Ind. 273
(1857); Baker v. Kistler, 13 Ind. 63 (1859). Iowa:Hardin Co. v. Wells, xo8 Ia. 174.
1o8 (1899) Kansas: St. L., Ft. Scott & Wichita Ry. Co. v. Grove, 39 Kan. 731
(1888). Kentucky: Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 (1916). Lousiana: Chase v. New
Orleans Gas Light Co., 45 La. Ann. 300 (1893). Maine :Burgess v. Denison
Paper Mfg. Co., 79 Me. 266 (1887). Maryland: McCart v. Regester, 68 Md.
429 (1888). Massachusetts: Temple v. Phelps, 193 Mass. 297 (i9o6). Michigan:
Dodge v. Stanton, 12 Mich. 408 (1864). Minnesota: Farnham v. Murch, 36
Minn. 328. Mississippi: Sivley v. Williamson, 112 Miss. 276 (1916). Missouri:
State ex rel. Spaulding v. Peterson, 142 Mo. 526 (1897). Montana: Penwell v.
Flickinger, 46 Mont. 526 (1913). Nebraska: Barker v. Wheeler, 62 Neb. 150
(190). New Jersey: Axel v. Kraemer, 75 N.J.L.688 (198). New~Mexico:Cun-
niugham v. Springer, 13 N. M. 259 (19o5). New Hampshire: MVcKeen v. Cook,
73 N. H. 410 (1905). New York: MeKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297 (1857). North
Carolina: N. C. Chemical Co. v. MeNair, 139 N. C. 326 (1905); North Dakota:
Bank v. Roberts, 2. N.D. 195. (1891). Ohio:Fewsterv. Goddard, 25 Ohio St. Rep.
276 (1874). Oklahoma: Mulhall v. Mulhall, 3 Okla. 252 (1895). Oregon: Benicia
Agricultural Works v. Creighton, 21 Ore. 495 (1892). Pennsylvania: Collins v.
Busch, 191 Pa. 549 (1899). Rhode Island: Glaser v. Rounds, 16 R. I. 235 (1888).
South Carolina: Parker v. Mayes, 85 S. C. 419 (191o). South Dakota: Fall v.
Johnson, 8 S. D. 163 (1896). Tennesee: Gosset v. Southern Ry. Co., 115 Tenn.
376 (1905). Texas: Key v. Hickman, 149 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 (1912).
United States: Choate v. Hoogstraat, lO5 Fed. 713 (1901). Utah: Heath v. White,
3 Utah 474 (1867). Vermont: Morrill & Co., v. N. E. Fire Ins. Co., 71 Vt. 281
(1899). Virginia: Whitleyv. Booker Brick Co., 113 Va. 434 (1912). Washington:
Palmer v. Parker, 91 Wash. 683 (1916). West Virginia: Shuman v. Shuman,
79 W. Va. 445 (1917). Wisconsin. Rossiter v. Schultz, 62 Wis. 655 (1885). (b)
English Cases: Fits v. Freestone, C. B., i Mod. 210 (1675); Carr v. Hinchliff,
K. B., 4 B. & C. 547 (1825); Brown v. Cornish, K. B., i Ld. Raym. 217 (1697).;
Paramore v. Johnson, K. B., i Ld. Raym. 566 (1700); Hatton v. Morse, 3 Salk.
273 (1702). Le Bret v. Papillon, K. B., 4 East 502 (1804); Goodchild v. Pledge,
i M. & W. 363 (1836); Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. 312 (1842); Thomas v.
Cross, 7 Exch. 728 (1852).
'See Pomeroy's Code Remedies (4th ed.), sec. 535, in which, in referring to Me-
Kyring v. Bull as the leading case on the subject, the author states: "The opinion
of Mr. Justice Selden is so full, accurate and able an exposition of the subject that
other judges have done little more than repeat his conclusions."
6It has been suggested that since the law never favors making one prove a
negative, the burden of proving payment might have been placed on the party
seeking to take advantage of it as a matter of sound policy, and in order to save
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II. HISTORY OF THE ANOMALY
Under the earlier common law pleading, the courts attempted to
enforce the rule that under the general issue the defendant was
limited to evidence tending to controvert the facts stated in the dec-
laration and could not dispute anything which went to dispute lia-
bility. Hence, if his defense was new matter, he was required to
plead it specially.
This strict and true theory of common law pleading never did fit
the action of debt on a simple contract. This was due to the pe-
,culiar character of the plaintiff's allegations in that action. The dec-
laration really stated a conclusion of law, which did not fairly apprise
the defendant of the plaintiff's actual cause of action, and made it
impracticable for him to plead specially. In fairness to the defend-
ant, therefore, the courts early adopted the rule that the defendant,
in an action of debt, could show anything under the general issue
that had a tendency to show no debt. The situation was not the
same in the action of general assumpsit. Mr. Justice Selden, in the
course of his masterly opinion in the leading case of McKyring v.
Bull,7 attributed the distinction as to the results in the two forms of
action (and no doubt correctly) to the difference in phraseology used
in the two forms of action. He said:8
"The declaration, in debt, averred an existing indebtedness,
and this amount was traversed by the plea of nil debet, in the
present tense; hence, nothing could be excluded which tended to
prove that there was no subsisting debt when the suit was com-
menced. In assumpsit, on the contrary, both the averment in
the declaration and the traverse in the plea were in the past,
instead of the present, tense, and related to a time anterior to
the commencement of the suit. Under non assumpsit, therefore,
so long as the rule of pleading which excludes all proof not strictly
within the issue was adhered to, no evidence could be received
except such as would tend to show that the defendant never
made the promise. That this was the view taken of these pleas
in the earlier cases, is clear."
Such was the situation when the action of indebitatus assumpsit
came in; that is, in all actions but debt, the strict theory that no
defense was available under the general issue, except such as went in
denial of the truth of the facts stated in the declaration. But the
development of this action saw a wide departure from the strict
the plaintiff from the necessity of proving a negative-nonpayment. Judge
Edward Hinton, Prof. of Pleading & Practice, U. of C., Class-room Lectures on
Code Pleading, Spring 1921-22.
716 N. Y. 297 (1857).
$At P. 299.
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theory of pleading. "The first departure was in relation to the
general issue in actions of indebitatus assumpsit." 9 As a matter of
theory, where the action was based on an implied promise, it could be
squared with the true theory of pleading, by reference to the peculiar
nature of the action of indebitatus assumpsit. The promise on
which the plaintiff relied was a mere fiction; it was an inference or
conclusion of law, raised by the law from the "debt or legal liability", 0
alleged as its consideration. This being true, it followed that what-
ever operated to disprove a subsisting debt or legal liability, at the
time of the commencement of the action, would go to disprove the
promise alleged. And as the existence of the debt could be challenged
by showing that it had been paid, its legal effect was to deny the
promise, and hence it supported the plea of non assumpsit." Speak-
ing of this, Mr. Justice Selden said:12
"But, notwithstanding the distinction adverted to * * * the
admission of the evidence, even in actions of indebitatus as-
sumpsit, was a plain departure from the issue upon non assump-
sit, which was, in terms, that the defendant had not promised;
a departure, however, supposed to be justified as a sacrifice of
form to substance."
At this point, as indicated by one of the text-writers, 3 it is well to
note that:
"In the action of indebitatus assumpsit, the plea of non as-
sumpsit, tho expressed in the past tense, does not mean that the
defendant did not actually promise, as stated in the declara-
tion (for the promise is not founded on a promise in fact); but
that he is, at the time of pleading, not indebted to the plaintiff,
or not in law liable to the demand, made in the declaration."
While the result achieved under the plea of non assumpsit in
indebitatus assumpsit, where the promise was implied in law, might
perhaps have been justified in legal theory, the same result in an
action of assumpsit on express promises, could not have been justified,
tho, as a matter of history, the end achieved was the same. Hence,
special matters of defense, such as payment, were, on principle, in-
admissible in the latter action. Such undoubtedly was the early
common law rule.
14
But the courts soon lost sight of the fact that the reasons for ad-
mitting payment and other affirmative defenses to be used under the
9Ibid., at p. 300.
"OThis has been called assumpsit in law; see the opinion in McKyring v. Bull,
supra, n. 7.
"Will's Gould on P1 (6th ed.) div. iv, ch. v, p. 5oI.
12Supra, n. 7, at p. 300.
"3Supra, n. ii.
14McKyring v. Bull, supra, n. 7; also n. ii.
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general issues in debt and indebitatus assumpsit were inapplicable to
the action of assumpsit upon an express promise, thru a failure to
keep in mind the fundamental distinction between the two forms of
action, and hence it is not surprising to find that the loose practices
that prevailed in those forms of action, should be carried over into
special assumpsit. Referring to this, Mr. Justice Selden said: 5
"By disregarding it [the distinction between the two forms
of action], a manifest incongruity in pleading was produced.
Tested by the language of the record, there was no difference in
the issue formed by the plea of non assumpsit, whether the
promise was express or implied. The courts, therefore, lost
sight, after a time, of the distinction upon which special defenses
were originally admitted in actions of indebitatus assumpsit
alone, and, looking only at the record, took another stride, and
admitted evidence of payment, release, arbitrament, &c., under
non assumpsit, without regard to the nature of the promise."
As a result of this remarkable transition, prior to 1834, in the action
of debt, indebitatus assumpsit, and special assumpsit, in fact, in all
actions of trespass on the case, whether arising ex contractu or ex
delicto under the general issue, any matter which would dispute the
truth of the declaration or avoid the liability, could be shown.'6
This proved very unsatisfactory. The plaintiff could not tell whether
the defendant was disputing a point of fact or denying liability,
altho the main object of the pleadings was to bring the parties to a
single, clear-cut, well-defined issue. As a result, there were constant
surprises during the trial, the parties were put to greater preparation
and additional expense, and new trials became more frequent. This
confusion created a persistent demand for some change, but the
courts had gone so far that they found it impossible to retrace their
steps.'7
To remedy the evils of this situation, it finally took an act of
Parliament, which, by the act of 3rd and 4 th William IV, ch. 42,
sec. i, conferred on the judges in Hilary Term, the authority to
llMcKyring v. Bull, supra, n. 7, at p. 3o; see in that case the opinion of Mr.
Justice Selden, where, in referring to this point, he said (p. 300): "That this was
the reasoning originally resorted to is plain from some of the older cases on the
subject. In Beckford v. Clarke, i Sid. 236, which was an action of assumpsit
brought upon a special promise to secure goods from perils, those of the sea ex-
cepted, the court of King's Bench heid that in assumpsit in fact, upon non-as-
sumpsit pleaded, a release could not be given in evidence as a defense, but
on assumpsit in law it might. So in the case of Fits v. Freestone, i Mod. (Eng.)
210, it was held: 'That in an action grounded upon a promise in law, payment
before the action brought is allowed to be given in evidence upon non-assumpsit;
but when the action is grounded upon a special promise, then payment or any
other legal discharge must be pleaded.'"
16Will's Gould on P1, supra, n. 13.
'7McKyring v. Bull, supra, n. 7, P. 301.
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formulate a new set of rules. The rules adopted in pursuance of
that authority are now familiarly known as the Hilary Rules, and
they provided, among other things, that in actions of assumpsit the
plea of non assumpsit should operate where the promise was express,
as a denial of the promise, and where it was implied, of the matters of
fact upon which the promise was founded.
In regard to this, a great judge said:18
"The object of this rule was to restore pleading in assumpsit to
its original logical simplicity. It was obviously intended as a mere
correction of previous judicial errors. It interprets the plea of
non assumpsit strictly according to its terms, and thus plainly
indicates that the courts had erred in departing from these
terms. That this was the view of the judges, is shown by the
different course taken in regard to the plea of nil debet. As this
plea, construed according to its terms, included every possible
defense within the issue which it formed, the judges did not
attempt to change the import of those terms, but abrogated the
plea. Rule two, under the head of "Covenant and Debt," pro-
vides that "The plea of nil debet shall not be allowed in any
action;" and rule three substitutes the plea of nmnquam in-
debitatus in its place. Thus the whole practice, which had con-
tinued for centuries, of receiving evidence of payment, and
other special defenses under the plea of nil debet and non as-
sumpsit, was swept away."
Ill. THEORIES AS TO How THE ANOMALY DEVELOPED
So much for the history of the anomaly. It consisted of three
distinct periods: (i) The period in which the strict theory of pleading
prevailed, or in which nothing could be shown under the general
issue except that which went to dispute the truth of the declaration;
(2) the period during which, under the general issue, not only matter
tending to dispute the truth of the declaration, but also matter deny-
ing liability, could be shown; (3) and finally, the period during which,
under the influence of the Hilary Rules, the old and strict theory of
pleading, under which matter disputing the truth of the facts stated
in the declaration, was all that could be shown under the general
issue, was restored. But all this fails to explain the real anomaly of
payment as an affirmative defense, how in debt on a simple contract,
instead of the plaintiff having to prove nonpayment, the defendant
had to prove payment, or the reason the defense of payment developed
as it did. This is left in the dark. By way of explanation of how the
anomaly developed, three theories have been advanced:
18 Ibid., at p. 302.
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THEORY NUMBER ONE
The first theory is based upon the nature of an action upon a
common law bond. In such a bond the defendant acknowledged
himself to owe and stand indebted to the plaintiff in a specified penal
sum, the same to become void on the payment of a less amount at a
future day. The plaintiff, in suing to recover the penalty, alleged a
promise on the part of the defendant and a failure to pay. Suppose
the defendant pleads that he has paid the same. His defense is not a
defense of payment in the true sense; it merely goes to show that the
bond is void, or offers an excuse for nonpayment. But this particular
plea of payment, made to show the bond is void or to show no lia-
bility, was sometimes pleaded specially. It is submitted that the
courts may have confused the plea of payment in a suit on a bond
with the true plea of payment, and thus held that the true plea of
payment had to be specially pleaded.19
THEORY NUMBER TWO
The second theory is based upon the supposition that perhaps the
plea of payment may originally have been a specific traverse. Thus,
suppose that the plaintiff sued the defendant for goods sold and de-
livered, at the defendant's request, and alleged nonpayment. Then,
suppose that the defendant specifically traversed stating that he did
pay. The defendant's plea is negative in effect, but affirmative in
form. As a result of using a specific traverse, which was affirmative in
form, the idea may have developed that the plea of payment was an
affirmative plea.20
THEORY NUMBER THREE
The third theory is based on the question of how much of the
burden of proof, as a matter of sound policy, ought to be placed on
the plaintiff in order for him to establish his case. It has been sug-
gested in this regard that the courts, not favoring the idea of forcing
the plaintiff to prove a negative-nonpayment-a thing the law
abhors, thought it good policy to place the burden of proving pay-
ment on the defendant, thus eliminating the necessity of the plaintiff
having to prove nonpayment, even tho it was alleged.2'
IV. DIFFERENT SITUATIONS ON PAYMENT AS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE AS E VOLVED FROM THE CASES THROUGH VARIATIONS
FROM THE GENERAL RULE
While the general rule, according to the weight of authority, is
19Class-room Lectures on Code Pleading by Professor Edward Hinton, U. of C.,
192I--22.
220 lfnton's Cases on Code Pleading (2d ed.), n. p. 525.2
,SuPra, n. I9.
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clear, there have been a number of departures from it in the nature of
contradictions, exceptions and variations. Altho no attempt is here
made to give a complete list of these, it is believed that the most im-
portant ones will be found below:
THE GENERAL RULE
Neither payment nor any other defense which confesses and avoids
the cause of action can in any case be given in evidence as a defense
containing simply a general denial of the allegations of the com-
plaint.I
CONTRADICTIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND VARIATIONS
I.
Payment may be shown under a general denial and need not be
pleaded specially.2
2.
Payment may be shown under a general denial in a suit on an
existing balance.2 4
3.
Payment may be shown under a general denial in a suit where the
indebtedness is merely stated in general terms.2 5
4-
Payment may be shown under a general denial where the fact of
nonpayment is alleged in the complaint as a necessary and material
fact to constitute a cause of action.28
5-
Payment may be shown under a general denial where the goods
have been paid for on delivery.2 7
6.
Payment may be shown under a general denial when no indebted-
uSee the cases collected in 30 Cyc. 1253, n. I5; 1262, n. 5.
nFor a collection of cases contra to the general rule, see 3o Cyc. 1262, n. 5.
24Fram v. Allen, I Mart. (La.) 567 (814); Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 183 (1867);
Quinn v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349 (1869); Stevens v. Thompson, 5 Kan. 305 (870);
Parker v. Hays, 7 Kan. 412 (187); White v. Smith, 46 N.Y. 418 (1871); McElwee
v. Hutchinson, 10 S. C. 436 (1878); Knapp v. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329 (1884); Brown
v. Forbes, 6 Dak. 273 (1889); Schwarzler v. McClenahan, 56 N. Y. S. 611 (1899);
Robertson v. Robertson, 37 Ore. 339 (I9OO); Conkling v. Weatherwax, 181 N. Y.
258 (19o5); Jones v. El-Reno Mill & Elevator Co., 26 Okla. 796 (i9io); Parker v.
Mayes, 85 S. C. 419 (i9IO); Acharan v. Samuel Bros., 128 N. Y. S. 943 (1910;
Kimball State Bank v. Harker, 35 S. D. 276 (i915); Shuman v. Shuman, 79 W.
Va. 445 (1917); contra, Bassett v. Lederer, i Hun (N.Y.) 274 (1874); see also 61
Am. Dec. 59, note; 2 Ann. Cases 740; Ann. Cases, 12 B, p. 487; Beatyv. Swarth-
out, 32 Barb. (N.Y.) 293 (186o); Howell v. Biddlecom, 62 Barb. (N.Y.) 131 (1862);
39 Cent. Dig., see. i58; Dec. Dig. 63 (3).25See the cases collected in 3o Cyc. 1263, n. IO.
2830 Cyc. 1262, n. 8.27McDonald v. Faulkner, 2 Ark. 472 (1839); Hendrickson v. Hutchinson, 29
N. J. L. I8o (i861); Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. (Eng.) 312 (1842).
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ness existed on account of money received and applied by the
defendant.28
7-
Payment, in a suit against an administrator, may be shown by
the administrator without pleading it specially.29
8.
Payment may be shown under a general denial if the defendant
files with the plea a descriptive account of the payments alleged to
have been made."0
9.
Payment may be shown under a general denial in an action on a
contract by a vendor against a vendee.31
Io.
Payment may be shown under a general denial in an action of
conversion in order to show no conversion32
II.
Payment may be shown under a general denial where it was made
before the assignment of the contract.3
12.
Payment may be shown under a general denial, even in a state
where the general rule is recognized, where no objection is made to
the introduction of evidence concerning payment, the court treat-
ing it as a case where the pleading was proper. 4
13.
An allegation of nonpayment is essential to a complaint, but is
not placed in issue by a general denial.35
14.
An allegation of nonpayment is not essential to a complaint, and
hence is not in issue under a general denial.8
I5.
Payment constitutes new matter which necessitates a reply.3 7
28Marvin v. Mandell, 125 Mass. 562 (1878).
29Gray v. Thomas, 12 S. & M. (Miss.) I1 (1849); but that the general rule in
Mississippi is contra, see Sivley v. Williamson, supra, n. 4.3 Richmond City Ry. Co. v. Johnson, go Va. 775 (1894).3 Patterson v. J. Walter Gage Realty Co., i5o N. Y. S. 215 (i914).32Albers v. Commercial Bank, 85 Mo. 173 (1884).3Penwell v. Flickinger, 46 Mont. 526 (i913).
34Mulhall v. Mulhall, 30 Okla. 252 (1895).
nLent v. N. Y. &. M. R. Co., 13o N. Y. 504 (1892).
3'Rossiter v. Schultz, 62 Wis. 655 (x885).
3!Hubler v. Pullen, 9 Ind. 273 (1857); Benicia Agricultural Works v. Creighton,
21 Ore. 495 (1892).
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i6.
Payment is not new matter which necessitates a reply.38
But the general rule and its contradictions, exceptions, and varia-
tions can be re-classified under the following main situations:
SITUATION NUMBER ONE
May payment be shown under a general denial?
3. Payment may be shown under a general denial and need not
be pleaded specially.
2. Payment may be shown under a general denial in a suit on
an existing balance.
3. Payment may be shown under a general denial in a suit
where the indebtedness is merely stated in general terms.
4. Payment may be show nunder a general denial where the
fact of nonpayment is alleged in the complaint as a necessary
and material fact to constitute a cause of action.
Miscellaneous Cases in Which Payment May be Shown Under
A General Denial
5. Payment may be shown under a general denial where the
goods have been paid for on delivery.
6. Payment may be shown under a general denial where no
indebtedness existed on account of money received and ap-
plied by the defendant.
7. Payment, in a suit against an administrator, may be shown
by the administrator without pleading it specially; this is by
statute.
8. Payment may be shown under a general denial if the defen-
dant files with the plea a descriptive account of the payments
alleged to have been made.
9. Payment may be shown under a general denial in an action
on a contract by a vendor against a vendee.
io. Payment may be shown under a general denial to show no
conversion.
3:. Payment may be shown under a general denial where it was
made before the assignment of the contract.
12. Payment may be shown under a general denial, even in a
State which recognizes the general rule, where no objection
is made to the introduction of evidence, the court treating it
as a case where the pleading was proper.
38Frish v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 (1862); Van Giesen v. Van Giesen, io N. Y. 316
(852); State ex rel. Spaulding v. Peterson, I42 Mo. 526 (1897).
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SITUATION NUMBER TWO
Is an allegation of nonpayment essential to a complaint?
i. An allegation of nonpayment is essential to a complaint, but
is not placed in issue by a general denial.
2. An allegation of nonpayment is not essential to a complaint,
and hence is not placed in issue by a general denial.
SITUATION NUMBER THREE
Is payment new matter which necessitates a reply?
i. Payment constitutes new matter which necessitates a reply.
2. Payment does not constitute new matter which necessitates
a reply.
V. GENERAL DiscussioN OF EACH PARTICULAR SITUATION
SITUATION NUMBER ONE
Payment May or May Not Be Shown under a General Denial
The early common law recognized a distinction between the issues
in debt and assumpsit, holding that in an action of debt any evidence
was admissible which controverted the claim of an existing in-
debtedness, while in assumpsit only such testimony as went to show
no liability had ever been assumed, which of course excluded proof
of payment. 9 While payment might be proved without a special
plea in an action of debt, a plea of payment was not thought objec-
tionable as amounting to the general issue because it confessed the
debt and avoided it by subsequent matter.40 But this early distinc-
tion was early changed, so that evidence disputing the facts stated or
seedng to avoid a liability, could be shown under the general issue in
either debt or assumpsit.4' And this is still the rule in some states. 2
In England, the practice was abolished by the Hilary Rules, and in
this country most states have adopted statutory provisions designed
to regulate the matter. As a result of this development at common
law and the influence of these statutes, it has been repeatedly stated,
and without qualifications, that the general rule is that payment is an
affirmative defense which cannot be relied upon unless specially
pleaded, and which cannot be shown under a general denial.4 The
leading case in support of this view is that of McKyring v. Bull,"
in which Mr. Justice Selden gave such an able exposition of the sub-
3916 Enc. P1. & Pr. 170; 30 Cyc. 1269.
40See Hinton's Cases on Code Pleading (2d ed.), footnote, p. 521, and cases
therein cited.41See History of Anomaly, div. II, Post, p. 271 el seg.
Fnsh v. Caler, sUpra, n. 38.
4316 Enc. P1. & Pr. 167; 21 Standard Enc. of Procedure 244; 30 Cyc. 1253.
4Supra, n. 7.
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ject that subsequent judges and writers have hardly dared to ques-
tion his conclusions. Diametrically opposed to this view is a mi-
nority group of cases which have held, and also without apparent
qualification, that payment is not an affirmative defense which must
be pleaded specially in order to be relied upon, but that it may be
shown under the general denial. The leading case in support of this
position is that of Wetmore v. San Francisco,5 in which Judge Crockett
took the view that the situation was practically the same as at
common law just prior to the inception of the Hilary Rules. In view
of these antagonistic positions, plus the fact that there exist a great
many exceptions to and variations from the general rule, it seems
that little is to be gained or understood by mere statement of the
general rule, without some qualification. Indeed, it is extremely
doubtful whether the rule, as usually stated, can, in any true or
accurate sense, be said to be the general rule. For as one writer
stated: 6
"It can not be maintained, upon principle, that paymentis al-
ways a defense of new matter, or, perhaps, that it may not, some-
times, be proved under a denial."
It may more accurately be said, as has been said,4a that:
"As * * * payment may or may not be new matter according
to the circumstances of the case, it follows that no such general
propositions as are constantly met with in the cases, can with
propriety and a reasonable understanding of the principles in-
volved, be made."
On a basis of strict analysis, what ought the rule to be? Suppose
the plaintiff sues the defendant on a promissory note, alleging that
the defendant made the note, transferred it to the plaintiff, and
that it has not been paid. Plea, general denial. What is in issue?
The general denial is said to put in issue all the material allegations of
the complaint, or everything which the plaintiff must prove in order
to establish his cause of action.48 Certainly the breach of the con-
tract-nonpayment-is material, and hence logically it should be in
issue under the general denial.4 9  This view has been taken in
California.50 But in answer to this contention, after admitting the
necessity of the allegation of the breach, Brown, J., in Lent v. N. Y.
Ry. Co.,51 says:
4644 Cal. 294 (1872).
'
8Supra, n. 2.
'
7See article on Payment by A. R. Watson, I6 Enc. P1. & Pr. 164, 178.
48Griffin v. L. I. Ry. Co., 161 N. Y. 348 (1886).49Van Giesen v. Van Giesen, io N. Y. 316 (1852); Krower v. Reynolds, 99 N. Y.
245 (1885); I Chitty P1. & Pr. pp. 325-359.
1SUl~ra
, 
n. 23.
1S-upra, n. .35, at P. 512.
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"That breach is always a fact, and it is of the very essence
of the cause of action. The complaint must show facts, which if
verified and not denied, prove to the clerk that the plaintiff
is entitled to the judgment which he demands. It cannot be said
that where the breach consists of nonpayment of an agreed sum,
it is not an issuable fact, because payment cannot be shown under
the general denial. The most that can be said is that that form of
denial does not put that fact in issue, and to that extent, the rule
that payment must be pleaded must be deemed to modify the
rule of pleading under the Code in reference to a general de-
nial."
But, after recognizing the inconsistency of this situation, the same
judge still further remarks:
"No reason is apparent how it can justify the omission from
the complaint of a fact material to the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion, and essential to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to a judg-
ment."
This amounts to saying that altho the breach must be alleged, there
is an exception to the general rule that the general denial places all
the material allegations of the complaint in issue. One is moved to
ask: If there is no apparent reason for omitting the breach from the
complaint, is there any apparent reason for creating an exception to
the rule that the general denial puts in issue all the material allega-
tions of the complaint? Clearly not. The creation of such an ex-
ception has been made necessary in order to support the arbitrary
rule that payment is an affirmative defense, for if the courts favoring
this view once admitted that the general denial put nonpayment in
issue, they would be forced to admit proof of payment under the
general denial as a matter of sound logic. They evade the conclusion
by the simple expedient of saying that in this particular case the scope
of the general denial has been narrowed by the rule that payment is an
affirmative defense, and hence does not deny the allegation of non-
payment. One writer 2 very aptly expressed the situation in the
following language:
"The anomaly of this situation is that altho nonpayment is a
material allegation and fact in the constitution of the plaintiff's
right of action, the defendant is not permitted to deny it under
the general denial and without special plea, though as has been
seen the general denial puts in issue every material allegation of
the complaint. Nor is the conflict of principles reconciled by the
natural step from this position that unless the defendant inter-
poses a special plea of payment, the plaintiff need not prove
nonpayment at all, but may have judgment on the pleadings
2Supra, n. 47, at p. 179.
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by merely giving the contract in evidence and without any proof
whatever of its breach." *
This might prove disastrous and subversive to fundamental prin-
ciples.5 3
The difficulty seems to lie in the fact that the courts have blindly
attempted to follow the statutory provisions without any regard to
the circumstances involved in each particular case, and on the theory
that the situation in this country after the adoption of the codes was
identical with the situation in England after the adoption of the
Hilary Rules. This, no doubt, is due in a large measure to the in-
fluence of Mr. Justice Selden, who, in McKyring v. Bull,5 4 after review-
ing the history of the anomaly, declared:
"There are several inferences to be drawn from this brief
review, which have a direct bearing upon our new and unformed
system of pleading in this state. The first is, that no argument can
be deduced from the former practice in this respect, in favor of allow-
ing payment, or any matter in confession and avoidance, to be
given under a general denial, as this practice has been abandoned
in England, not only as productive of serious inconvenience, but
as a violation of all sound rules of interpretation."
With all deference to the learned judge, it would seem that this
conclusion does not necessarily follow. The Hilary Rules were never
adopted in this country. Hence, in the absence of statutory provi-
sions, the natural course would have been for us to adopt the common
law rule as it existed just prior to 1834. Then, too, these statutes
which have been passed, have not dealt with the problem directly,
but only by way of inference and implication,55 thus leaving it as a
matter of construction, whether under their influence, payment is
always an affirmative defense. Since at common law payment came
to be admissible in either debt or indebitatus assumpsit under the
general issue, and since the question of whether payment is an
affirmative defense under the statutes is a problem of construction, on
which all authorities are not agreed, it is not so clear that no
argument in favor of allowing payment to be given in evidence under
63"But if the plaintiff is not required to allege a breach of the contract, or state
the amount due, as his verification would cover only the facts alleged, the clerk,
under * * * the Code, would be authorized to enter judgment for the whole
amount called for by the contract, and this without proof of the amount due
thereon. This would be contrary to the whole spirit of the Code, and wouldre-
quire the clerk to presume a fact neither alleged or proved, viz., that no payments
had been made. These views show how essential it is that the plaintiff should
allege the breach of the contract of which he complains." Justice Brown, in
Lent v. Ry. Co., supra, n. 35, at p. 512.
USupra, n. 7, at p. 302.55These statutes provide, in general, that new matter must be pleaded affirm-
atively, but they make no attempt to define what constitutes new matter; this
leaves the matter one for construction on the part of the courts.
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a general denial can be deduced from the former practice in England.
In substance, these statutes provide that the answer, among other
things, must contain: "A statement of any new matter constituting
a defense or counterclaim, in ordinary and concise language." 8
Such a statute, it will be noted, in no way defines what constitutes
new matter, but leaves it as a matter for the uncertainty of con-
struction and logic. Accordingly, we find the courts have divided on
the question of what constitutes new matter, particularly in regard to
the subject of payment. Thus, for example, in Indiana, under the
influence of a local statute, 7 in an action on a bill of exchange, in
which the plaintiff alleged nonpayment, evidence of payment was in-
admissible under the general denial,58 whereas in California, on the
same fact basis, it was held admissible. One jurisdiction holds the
plea of payment is new matter, regarding itself as bound by the
statute; the other, looking more at the logic of the situation, holds it
is not new matter.
New matter is generally agreed to be something in addition to and
not involved in the issue raised by the general denial.5 9 But as to
what comes within the scope of this definition, there is no agreement.
The conflict seems to wage about the point of whether nonpayment is
or is not an essential allegation in the plaintiff's complaint. If it is,
then it ought to be in issue under the general denial; if not, then it is
not in issue under the general denial and is new matter which must
be specially pleaded. 0
This raises the question: When is nonpayment material? It
has been suggested by one writer" that the allegation of nonpayment
would be material in any case where nonpayment meant nonpayment
at maturity, but that a general allegation that an obligation had not
been paid would not be material, because under such an allegation it
might be that payment was made after maturity or breach, which,
of course, would mean that a liability once existed, and hence, under
the statutory rule, would have to be specially pleaded. Under this
view, it is contended that payment before breach or maturity would
not be new matter even under the general denial of the code states,
altho payment after breach would be new matter which would have to
be available as a defense.
6N. Y. C. P., sec. 500.57The Indiana statute provided: "All defenses, except the mere denial of the
facts alleged bytheplaintiff, shall be specially pleaded." 2 Ind. R. S., sec. 66, p. 4.58Hubler v. Pullen, 9 nd. 273 (1857); Frish v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 (1862).
59z6 Enc. P1. & Pr. 176.6 For a further discussion of this problem, see infra.6 Supra, n. 47.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
As to when nonpayment is essential or non-essential, probably
the most that can be said is that it depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. But for the purpose of determining this ques-
tion, one judge6 has offered the following helpful classification of
cases:
CLASS NUMBER ONE
"In an action upon a contract for the payment of money only,
where the complaint does not allege a balance due over and above
all payments, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to allege and prove a
breach of the obligation by the nonpayment thereof when it
matured, as the presumption of nonpayment continues until
met by the allegation of and proof of payment."
CLASS NCUMBER TWO
"When the complaint sets forth a balance in excess of all
payments, owing to the structure of the pleading, it is necessary
for the plaintiff to prove the allegation as made, and this leaves
the amount of the payments open to the defendant under a gen-
eral denial."
CLASS NUMBER THREE
"When the action is not upon contract for the payment of
money, but is upon an obligation created by operation of law,
or if for the enforcement of a lien where nonpayment of the
amount secured is part of the cause of action, it is necessary to
both allege and prove the fact of nonpayment."
In two out of the three classes of cases, it is clear, according to
Justice Vann, that the allegation of nonpayment is put in issue by
the general denial. ;,
In the same case, Cullen, C. J., admits the logic of his colleague's
conclusions and of his classification, but takes refuge in the simple
statement that altho the conclusions are logical, they do not represent
the law." He also admits that a legal paradox exists which ought not
to exist, and says that if we were rearing a new system of jurispru-
dence, it should be carefully avoided.#
6 Vann, J., in Conkling, v. Weatherwax, supra, n. 24, at p. 268.
0"However logical this decision may be it plainly conflicts with the settled law
of this state that payment, when the plaintiff declares on a specific obligation,
must be pleaded, for that was expressly held in the McKyring case, and Judge
Brown in the Lent case concedes the binding authority of the earlier decision."
Ibid., at p. 273.
6"I imagine, however, that the paradox is not confined to either that state
[W. Va.] or our own, but exists to a greater or less degree in most jurisdictions
which follow the common law. A legal paradox is not to be commended and if we
were about to develop a new system of jurisprudence, should be carefully avoided.
It does not, however, necessarily create a confusion in the law if the courts will
only stand by their decisions." Ibid., p. 277.
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From the foregoing, perhaps the following conclusions may be
drawn:
i. That the usual statement of the general rule, without quali-
fication, is neither correct nor helpful.
2. But if a general rule must be stated, probably the most that
can be said is this Granted a case wherein nonpayment is an essential
element in the complaint, a general denial puts payment in issue, and
hence payment is not new matter which must be pleaded specially;
but granted a case wherein nonpayment is not an essential element
in the complaint, a general denial does not put payment in issue, and
hence payment is new matter which must be pleaded specially.6
3. It would seem that the doctrine, that a general denial does not
put the fact of payment when due in issue, and hence that the plain-
tiff need not prove nonpayment, is, on a strict basis of logic, ex-
tremely doubtful, if not entirely untenable.66 As to whether the
doctrine may be otherwise justified will be considered later.Y
PAYMENT IN AN ACTION FOR AN EXISTING BALANCE
While it is true, generally speaking, that payment cannot be shown
in defense of an action under the traverse alone, but must be specifical-
ly alleged as matter of avoidance to be available, to this rule there
seems to be some well-settled exceptions. One of these is in the case
of an action for an existing balance.6 8 The rule as to this exception
has been clearly stated in Ruling Case Law as follows: 9
"Where an allegation, not stated as a conclusion of law, is so
framed that an issue is presented by the traverse on the fact of
the amount due, proof of payment is admissible without an
affirmative plea in the nature of a further defense. Thus, where
a person sues to recover a balance due, which he alleges not
merely as a conclusion of law but as a fact, and which he must
prove in order to sustain his action, it is well-settled that the
defendant may show payment under a general denial, because the
amount of the indebtedness, being the only fact alleged by which
it is said to exist, it is traversable, and being traversed, it is
proper to show payment under the issue thus formulated, to
refute the fact of its existence."
Probably the earliest American case of an action for an existing
balance was the Louisiana case of Fram v, Allen,70 decided in 1814,
which was an action brought upon an account current, in which
the plaintiff claimed a balance, and the defendant pleaded the general
6Supra, n. 2.
6 Supra, n. 47.
67See the discussion on this point, infra, p. 295 et seg.
68See the cases collected and arranged in chronological order, supra, n. 24.
6921 R. C. L., see. 127.
7 0S-upra, n. 24.
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issue. At the trial, the defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff
had omitted certain credits in his favor, but the evidence was re-
jected on the ground that he had not pleaded payment specially.
The plaintiff won below, but on appeal the court held that the evi-
dence of payment should have been received. The court said:7'
"The subject of the inquiry here is not, whether the plea of
compensation can be considered as included in the general issue;
for it is a positive rule of our judicial proceedings that com-
pensation must be pleaded specially. (Recop. de Cast. book 4,
tit. 5, law i.) The question is, whether this is a case in which
compensation ought to have been pleaded at all."
The court then argued that payment took place only where mutual
debts were liquidated, and since the plaintiff, instead of suing the
defendant for the full price of the total amount of the goods fur-
nished, undertook to oppose the defendant's claims to his by filing for
the balance, and thus sought to compare the claims and arrive at a
balance, it was clear that the amount due was not liquidated, but
that the suit itself was to obtain liquidation. The court finally re-
marked:
"In such a case, both accounts are put at issue, and evidence
tending to support or contradict the correctness of either ought
to be admitted."
This decision seemed for a time to have settled the law in Louis-
iana, but in the year 1834, in the case of Gleises v. Faurie,12 in the
same type of case the Louisiana court took the view that "Payment is
a peremptory exception." 73 going to extinguish the action, and which
may be pleaded at any stage of the case. It attempted to distinguish
the case from that of Fram v. Alke, 7 4 but only by the statement that
since the decision in that case, the Code had come into existence.
So, in Louisiana while apparently the law is settled, it is so somewhat
arbitrarily.
The next important case was that of Marley v. Smith,75 which arose
in Kansas, and in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
indebted to him on an account, and that the same was due and un-
paid. The defendant filed a general denial, and at the trial offered
to prove: (i) a set-off; (2) a counterclaim; and (3) payment. All
three offers were rejected. On appeal the decision was reversed, the
upper court holding that the lower court erred in refusing the evi-
7 1At p. 567.
76. La. Ann. 455 (1854).7Expression taken from the Spanish law; see the explanation given in Gleises
v. Faurie, supra, n. 72; see also Reiner's v. St. Ceran, i9 La. Ann. 207 (1867).74Supra, n. 24.
USupra, n. 24.
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dence of payment, but that it was correct in excluding proof of the
set-off and counterclaim. Speaking in support of its conclusions, the
court, thru Kingman, J., declared:7
"And if the question were free from embarrassment, grow-
ing out of decisions and commentaries, it would seem equally
obvious that payment could be proved under the issue as made
up. The petition avers that at a certain time the defendant
was indebted to the plaintiff, and that the indebtedness still
continues. This is denied, and to sustain the denial, proof
of payment is offered. Can any fact be plainer than, if pay-
ment was made, the indebtedness does not last? Can a man
owe a debt he has paid? Can he be indebted when he has ex-
tinguished the indebtedness by payment? There can be but one
answer to these questions, and this answer shows logically,
and without any straining upon such a petition and answer,
the proof of payment could legitimately be made."
The court then points out that the same question had been decided
both ways in New York,78 to be finally set at rest by the case of
McKyring v. Bull.7 7 But, says the court :
"* * * the reasoning of the learned judge who delivered the
opinion of the majority of the court, would sustain the admissi-
bility of the evidence under such pleadings as are before us."
Between the first Kansas case,78 decided in 1867, and the second,7 9
decided in 1871, and to the same effect as the first, came the New
York decision of Quinn v. Lloyd8 in 1869. The substance of that
case has been well-stated in the Encyclopedia of Pleading & Practice:8'
"This was an action to recover for work and labor. The com-
plaint stated the contract, the performance of the services, the
stipulated price, and that on a certain day named the defendant
was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $333.00, being the
balance remaining due after sundry payments made by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff. The answer was a general denial under
which the court held, that the plaintiff could offer proof of pay-
ments. In this case Lott J., said: 'The denial * * * involved
an issue upon facts above stated and denied, not only of the
agreement and of the time which the plaintiff worked, but neces-
sarily of the different payments made, so as to determine what,
in fact, was the balance of the defendant's debt. That balance
could not be ascertained without an inquiry as to the amount
of the payments as well as the value of the work performed.'
75
aAt p. 186.
76Quiun v. Lloyd, supra, n. 24, reversing Quinn v. Lloyd, I Sweeney (N.Y.) 253.77Supra, n. 7.
7aAt p. 186.
78Supra, n. 24.
791"id.
8ObW.
8'Vol. 16, ch. I8, sec. 365, n. 24.
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In the same case, Woodruff, J., says: 'It was not necessary for the
plaintiff to sue for the balance as such. He might allege the con-
tract, the performance on his part and claim payment; and then,
if the defendant desired to prove payments he must allege pay-
ment in his answer. But were the plaintiff sues for a balance,
he voluntarily invites examination into the amount of the in-
debtedness and the extent of the reduction thereof by pay-
ments.' "
In the course of its decision, the court felt the necessity of either ad-
mitting that the case of McKyring v. Bull was contra, !as has been
held by at least one text-writer,8 or attempting to distinguish it.
Kingman, C. J., in the case of Marley v. Smith,8 apparently ac-
cepted the view that the case of McKyring v. Bullu is directly contra
to the line of cases holding that in an action for an existing balance
the defendant may show payment under a general denial. In this,
he is not without some authoritative support.86 Lott, J., in Quinn v.
Lloyd,87 meets the difficulty by attempting to distinguish the cases on
their facts. He says:
"The case of McIKyring v. Bull, relied on by the respondent,
cannot be considered an authority to sustain the referee's decision
and the judgment of the court below. In that case, the com-
plaint alleged that the plaintiff entered into the employment of
the defendant on a particular day, and continued there in
doing work and labor for him to a specified and fixed date, and
then averred that such work and services were worth the sum of
*65o.oo, and then it concluded as follows: 'That there is now due
to this plaintiff, over and above all payments and set-offs on account
of said work, the sum of $134.oo, which said defendant refuses to
pay.' It will be seen by this statement, that the term of service
and its value were both alleged, from which it appeared that a
much larger sum had become payable to the plaintiff than he
claimed. The learned judge who gave the prevailing opinion
in the case says, in reference to the allegation, that there was due
to the plaintiff at the commencement of the suit, over and above
all expenses, &c., the sum there named, is a mere legal con-
clusion from the facts previously stated. Its nature is not
changed by the addition of the words, 'over and above all pay-
ments.' No new fact is thereby alleged. The plaintiff volun-
tarily limits his demand to a sum less than that to which, under
the facts averred, he would be entitled. 'In the case underre-
view, as I have before stated, no facts are alleged from which it
can be known what the work, at the stipulated price agreed to
82Supra, n. 7.
8Supra, n. 2.
84Supra, n. 24.
9Supra, n. 7.
8Supra, n. 2.81Supra, n. 24, at p. 352.
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be paid, was worth, and consequently there is nothing to show
that the claim made was less than upon the facts stated he was
entitled to."'88
The distinction here attempted to be drawn has been widely ac-
cepted and acted upon, and perhaps correctly so, but on close in-
spection, it is not entirely clear that it can be demonstrated to be
logically sound. To say the least, it seems rather blind, unless in-
deed, there is some reason of policy behind the position taken in
McKyring v. Bull.8 9 If Woodruff, J., speaking in Quinn v. Lloyd, ° is
right when he says it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue for a
balance as such, but that if he did, he must submit to an examination
into the amount of the indebtedness and the extent of the reduction
thereof by payment, or else sue for the entire amount due and not
the balance, which would force the defendant to plead any payments
specially, then Selden, J.,11 must be wrong when he, in referring to
the defendant's contention that the general denial put in issue the
allegation "that there was due to the plaintiff at the commencement
of the suit, over and above all payments, etc., the sum of $134.00",
stated:
"But this allegation is a mere legal conclusion from the facts
previously stated. Its nature is not changed by the addition
of the words 'over and above all payments'. No new fact is
alleged thereby. The plaintiff voluntarily limits his demand to
a sum less than that to which, under the facts averred, he would
be entitled."
It seems that the learned judge, out of his high regard for the
writer of the opinion in McKyring v. Bull,9 was too bent on finding
some rational basis of distinction, and did not have the courage of his
convictions, as did Kingman, J., in Marley v. Smith. But even
Kingman, J., in-the later case of Parker v. Hays,9 4 seems to be recon-
ciled to the distinction there made. Phillips on Code Pleading, how-
ever, cites McKyring v. Bull a contra to Quinn v. Lloyd, rather than
as distinguishable."
Reduced to its simplest form, what Lott, J., says, is this: In
McKyring v. Bull,96 the plaintiff stated facts from which it appeared a
much larger sum had once been due to the plaintiff than he claimed at
88The italics are the writer's.89Supra, n. 7.9OSupra, n. 24.9 Supra, n. 7, at p. 303.2Ibid.
9Supra, n. 24.9 4 bid.
OSupra, n. 2.
9Supra, n. 7.
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the time of the suit, and that the phrase "over and above all pay-
ments" was a mere legal conclusion drawn from the facts stated,
serving to limit his claim to less that the total amount once due;
whereas in Quinn v. Lloyd,97 there were no facts stated by which it
appeared that a larger sum than the plaintiff was claiming had at
one time been due. In short, the only factual difference between the
two cases was that in McKrying v. Bul 9 8 the total amount originally
due was stated, whereas in Quinn v. Lloyd99 the total amount origi-
nally due was not stated. While this is true, in Quinn v. Lloyd'0 0 a
balance was claimed, from which it could be as clearly implied that a
much larger sum had once been payable to the plaintiff than he had
claimed, as if the original amount once due had been stated, as in
McKyring v. Bull.'0 ' In both cases, the plaintiff was claiming a
balance. The real problem seems to be whether the general denial
is to be allowed to put a conclusion in issue as a fact. It is allowed to
do so in Quinn v. Lloyd.'0° And there is no apparent reason why it
should not also do so in McKyring v. Bull,'0' merely because facts
from which the conclusion is drawn are stated in the complaint.
In McKyring v. Bull,104 it is said that the conclusion contained in the
phrase "over and above all payments" served to limit the plaintiff's
claim to less than was originally due. If this phrase served as an
allegation of sufficient materiality to accomplish this end, then why is
it not of sufficient importance to be put in issue as a fact? In any
event, the pleader is claiming a balance, whether it appears from the
facts stated what was originally due or not, and this slight factual
difference is hardly enough to justify the difference in results in the
two cases. The writer recognizes the force of Selden's, J., suggestion,
when he said:'05
"A second inference is that, in regard to pleading, it is indis-
pensable to adhere to strict logical precision in the interpreta-
tion of language.* * * But the most important inference to be de-
duced from the historical sketch just given consists in an ad-
monition to adhere rigidly to that rule of pleading which per-
mits a traverse of facts only, and not of legal conclusions."
But if this suggestion is to be followed, it is submitted that the
97S-apra, n. 24.9sS-upra, n. 7.
99Supra, n. 24.loofbid.
°I"Supra, n. 7.
102Supra, n. 24.
' 0Supra, n. 7.
20Ibid.
20IbiW., at p. 302.
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pleader, in cases such as Quinn v. Lloyd, 0° should be required to
state the facts so as to show what was originally due, and thus ob-
viate the necessity of making such a technical distinction as was made
by Lott, J., in Quinn v. Lloyd.10 7
The next case was that of White v. Smith, 08 which was an action
brought upon an account for work, labor, and materials, plaintiff
alleging the amount of the account to be $541.9o and that there was a
balance due, after deducting all payments, of $175.75. The court held
that the complaint admitted a payment of $366.15, and that the de-
fendant was not precluded from insisting upon the admissions, by
disputing the correctness of the items of the account. Here it actual-
ly appeared that the plaintiff voluntarily limited his claim to less
than at one time had been payable, and yet the court does not insist
that payment should have been pleaded affirmatively, as it clearly
should have done in order to have followed the distinction which,
Lott, J., laid down in Quinn v. Lloyd.1'9 The question as to therightof
the defendant to prove payment of a larger amount than admittedly
had been paid, was not raised.
Acharan v. Samuels"0 was an action for a balance due upon a
running account, the plaintiff admitting partial payment. It added
a qualification to the general rule as to suits for existing balances,
which is best expressed in the words of Obrien, J., when he says .10'
"It would seem from a review of the cases that the second
rule enunciated by Justice Vann in Conkling v. Weatherwax,"'
is to be limited to cases in which the plaintiff declares generally
upon a balance due, so as to leave both sides of the account open
upon the general issue, but that when there is as in the present
case the allegation of a specific amount as originally due and an
admission of partial payments thereon, a general denial puts in
issue the original amount due, but does not permit proof of pay-
ments thereon beyond the amount admitted in the complaint.
If it is claimed more has been paid than is so admitted, pay-
ment must be alleged and proved by the defendant."
From this survey of the cases, these three propositions seem clear:
i. That in an action for an existing balance, where the plaintiff
declares generally on a balance due, the defense of payment may be
shown under a general denial, and it is not new matter in confession
and avoidance.
'0Supra, n. 24.10 7.
108 Zb..
109 TbOd"
110IbTd.
nOaAt P. 945.
ulSee the second rule stated, infra p. 276.
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2. That in suing on an open account, it is always advisable for the
plaintiff, to sue on the account as it was originally and omit any
allegation as to the amount the defendant has paid, leaving the same
to be pleaded as a defense by the defendant.
3. That where there is an allegation of a specific amount due and
an admission of partial payments thereon, a general denial puts in
issue the original amount due, but does not permit proof of pay-
ments thereon beyond the amount admitted.
PAYMENT IN A SUIT WHERE THE INDEBTEDNESS IS ALLEGED
GENERALLY
Another exception to or variation from the general rule is found in
the case where the plaintiff alleges the indebtedness generally, with-
out stating the grounds thereof."2 In that situation, it has been
held that payment may be shown under a general denial and in the
absence of a special plea. The leading case on this point is that of
Marley v. Smith."' The theory of that case cannot be better stated
than in the words of Kingman, J., when, in Parker v. Hays,"4 he
said:
"If the pleader chooses to state his case without setting
forth whether his claim arose on contract or tort, or at least on
the request of the defendant, or that the materials were of
certain value, as charged, and a promise to pay therefor, but
merely states an indebtedness, without stating how it arose, he
invites an issue upon whether there is an indebtedness, and an
examination into that issue by testimony; and this can be gone
into by the defendant under a general denial."
In the case of Stevens v. Thompson,"5 the case of Marley v. Smith"'
was clearly distinguished from one wherein the facts which constitute
the basis of the indebtedness are set out. Kingman, J., the same
judge who delivered the opinion in Marley v. Smith 7 , said:
"The case [at bar] is wholly unlike that of Marley v. Smith,
4 Kansas 185. In that case the petition only alleged indebted-
ness generally, without stating the grounds of the indebtedness.
In this case the facts constituting the plaintiff's claim are fully
stated; these facts only are denied by the answer. In the case
of Marley v. Smith, 4 Kansas 185, the plaintiff had chosen to
risk his case upon a conclusion from facts. Any fact that would
re"And in at least one jurisdiction evidence of payment is admissible under a
general denial where the complaint merely alleges the indebtedness in general
terms, but not where particulars of the claims are stated." 30 Cyc. 1262.
"
3Supra, n. 24.
mlbid., at p. 414.
m1bid., at p. 311.11 Ibid.
ll7bid.
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show the conclusion untrue was legitimate and proper evi-
dence under such a state of pleadings, but it was not intended
to say, nor was it said, that the general denial would authorize
proof of payment in any case in which the petition set out the
facts on which the plaintiff's claim rested."
The theory in Marley v. Smithn 8 is somewhat analogous to the
theory under which, at early common law, in the action of debt,
most any defense was admitted under the general issue.n 9 Un-
doubtedly, as long as such statements of a cause of action are per-
mitted, it is only fair to admit any defense under the general denial,
but it seems that the general theory of pleading may be better pre-
served by requiring the cause to be more specifically stated, so that
the general rule that payment is an affirmative defense may be con-
sistently and justly followed. This would also have the added merit
of eliminating an exception to or variation from the general rule.
WHERE THE PACT OF NONPAYMENT IS ALLEGED AS A NECESSARY
AND MATERIAL PACT
In the case of Knapp v. Roche,'20 still another variation is stated in
the following language:
"While it is generally true that a defense of payment is inad-
missible under a general denial, this is not so when the fact of
nonpayment is alleged in the complaint as a necessary and ma-
terial fact to constitute a cause of action. It is always com-
petent to prove under a general denial any facts tending to con-
trovert the material affirmative allegations of a complaint."''
This rule has been recognized in other cases and by the text-
writers.2 Knapp v. Roche'" involved an action against an officer of
a bank for making loans of its funds in a manner not authorized by
law, the plaintiff alleging nonpayment of the funds. The defendant
pleaded the general denial, and at the trial wanted to prove payment.
The court held that the general denial of the allegation of nonpay-
ment of the money so loaned put the fact of payment in issue. The
court remarked:
"The only damage occuring to such bank in consequence of
the acts of the defendant as stated in the complaint was that
18..
"'For a detailed statement of this development, see the History of the Anom-
aly, div. II, POSI, p. 271, et seg.
12094 N. Y. 329 (1884).
r'The difficulty here is to determine when nonpayment is alleged as a necessary
and material fact; a suggestion as to this may be found, post p. 283, et seq.12See 30 Cyc. 1262; Phillips on Code Pleading, supra, n. 2; 16 Enc. Pl. & Pr.
176, n. 3.
WSupra, n. 120.
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such loans remained due and unpaid at the commencement of
the action."
The same rule seems to apply in actions on official bonds.ns In
the case of Barker v. Wheeler"5 the plaintiffs sued the defendants as
sureties upon an official bond, alleging that one E was county judge
during a certain term, that the defendant's X and Y were the sureties
upon his official bond; that E, in his official capacity, received cer-
tain money belonging to the plaintiff and converted it to his use.
The answer was a general denial. At the trial, the defendants offered
evidence to show that E, while acting as county judge, paid the plain-
tiff's money to her duly constituted guardian. The evidence was re-
jected. On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court held the evidence
should have been received, as payment was not new matter, as it was
offered, not to show a discharge of an obligation that once existed,
but that no liability had ever accrued.26
This type of case again illustrates that altho payment is usually
referred to and regarded as a plea in confession and avoidance, and
hence as involving new matter, the defense of payment is not neces-
sarily of this nature.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES IN WHICH PAYMENT MAY BE SHOWN UNDER
A GENERAL DENIAL
Yet to be noted are a number of miscellaneous cases,27 covering a
reState v. Peterson, 142 Mo. 526 (1897); Barker v. Wheeler, 62 Neb. i5O (goi).125Supra.
'Sullivan, J., at p. 151, said: "But neither this court, nor any other so far as
we know, has ever held in an action on an official bond or other bond of indemnity,
that the plaintiff was, by a general denial, relieved of the necessity of proving the
loss or injury out of which arose his right of action. The defendants did not by
their bond become indebted to the plaintiff; they assumed no specific obligation
to her which they were bound at all events to discharge by payment or otherwise;
their promise, given to the county of Douglas, was to make good any loss that the
county or individuals might sustain by reason of the official misconduct of Eller.
This being so, it would be illogical-it would be inconsistent with reason and
common sense-to hold that a general denial, like the plea of non-assumpsit,
put in issue nothing but the execution of the bond. An offer to prove payment is
not in every case an implied admission that the plaintiff once had an actionable
demand against the defendant; its purpose may be, as in this case, to prove that
a right of action never existed. Eller received the money in question rightfully;
his possession of it as county judge was lawful, and there is no presumption that
he was guilty of official misconduct. The allegation of conversion was, therefore,
a material one, and it was not admitted by a general denial. Payment was not
new matter, within the meaning of section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for
it was offered, not to show the discharge of an obligation that once existed, but
to show that the bond had not been forfeited as alleged * * *."
127Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. (Eng.) 312 (I842) (payment on delivery in suit
for goods sold and delivered); Marvin v. Mandell, supra, n. 28 (payment of ad-
vances previously made to plaintiff); Gray v. Thomas, supra, n. 29 (suit against
an administrator; statutory); Richmond City Ry. Co. v. Johnson, supra, n. 30
(payment proved under a descriptive account filed with plea); Patterson v. Walter
Gage Realty Co., supra, n. 31 (suit by a vendor against a vendee on a contract
to purchase real estate); Albers v. Commercial Bank, supra, n. 32 (payment to
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variety of human affairs and in which payment is admitted under a
general denial. They are merely noticed as further illustrations of
variations from the general rule, and also to support the statement,
previously made, that the question as to whether payment is or is not
an affirmative defense, cannot be settled by the arbitrary, unqualified
statement of a general rule, but must, to a large degree, depend upon
the special circumstances of each particular case.
SITUATION NUMBER TWO
Is an Allegation of Nonpayment Essential to a Complaint?
Is it logical to say that an allegation of nonpayment is essential to a
complaint, and yet, under a general denial, does not operate to put
payment in issue? Answering this question in the affirmative, is the
leading case of Lent v. N. Y. Ry. Co., 2 8 decided under a statute,2 9
which was an action to recover the amount awarded to the plaintiff
in certain condemnation proceedings. The complaint alleged the
various proceedings resulting in the award, but did not allege non-
payment. The defendant demurred. In the argument of the de-
murrer, the plaintiff contended that since payment was an affirma-
tive defense, which had to be pleaded to be available, nonpayment did
not have to be alleged, as it was not a fact put in issue by the general
denial.1 0 The court admitted the force of the contention, and the
inconsistency of requiring an allegation in the complaint which could
not be put in issue by a general denial, but held, nevertheless, that the
presence of this anomaly furnished no ground for further extending
the rule, so as to hold the allegation of nonpayment not an essential
element of the cause of action.' The court argued that such a
course would result in even greater embarrassment than would come
from requiring nonpayment to be alleged, altho the allegation need
not be proved. In support of this, the court said: 32
"The complaint should show facts which, if verified and not
denied, prove to the clerk that the plaintiff is entitled to the judg-
ment which he demands."
Finally, the court concludes that nonpayment must be pleaded,
show no conversion); Mulhall v. Mulhall, supra, n. 34 (where no objection to
evidence of payment); Penwell v. Fleckinger, supra, n. 33 (payment before as-
signment).
328Supra, n. 35.
"'Sec. 481, New York Code,provides: "The complaint must contain a plain
and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action."
"0This view had been adopted in Salisbury v. Stinson, io Hun (N. Y.) 242
(1877), which case was subsequently overruled by Tracy v. Tracy, 59 Hun
(1891).
"'In fact, the authority seems to point in the other direction; see supra, n. 48;
see also the authorities in Lent v. Ry. Co., supra, n. 35.lnSupra, n. 35, at p. 512.
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altho not placed in issue by the general denial, and hence the genera
rule under the code that a general denial puts in issue all the material
allegations of the complaint, is subject to an exception, created by
the rule that payment must be pleaded affirmatively. It should be
noted that this case arose on demurrer, and hence the statement of
the court that nonpayment was not put in issue by the general
denial might be regarded as obiter dicta. However, the statement
probably represents the law as it is in New York and in a majority of
the states."'
Directly opposed to this position, and answering the above ques-
tion in the negative, is the case of Rossiter v. Schultz,"4 in which the
plaintiff alleged that he had owned a certain scow, that on a certain
date the defendants purchased said scow, together with a derrick,
for $i,5oo.oo, which the defendants agreed to pay. The plaintiff
then demanded jtidgment, making no allegation of nonpayment.
The defendant demurred, and contended that no cause of action had
been stated, because the complaint contained no allegation of breach
on the defendant's part. The court, contrary to the view taken in
Lent v. N. Y. Ry. Co.,"' regarded this as "A mere technical objection
and not a substantial one." Says the court:
"If he had alleged it in his complaint, he would not have been
required to prove it, even tho the defendant had answered by
alleging a payment of the price, nor upon a general denial.
Why, then, under the statutory pleading, should the plaintiff
be required to make an allegation in his complaint which it is
unnecessary to prove at the trial?'36 We see no reason for
such allegation."
The court finally held that nonpayment was not put in issue by a
general denial, and hence did not constitute an essential element of
the complaint. Both the New York and Wisconsin courts recognized
the validity of the rule that a complaint must contain all the facts
which upon a general denial the plaintiff must prove to be entitled
to a judgment, but they differed as to what the plaintiff must prove,
which here means they differed as to whether nonpayment was one of
the facts the plaintiff must prove. That is, the New York court held
that nonpayment was an essential allegation which had to be alleged,
even tho, when met by a general denial, it did not have to be proved;
whereas, the Wisconsin court held that since nonpayment was not a
fact put in issue by a general denial, it did not have to be alleged at all.
13Ibd.; see also supra, n. 7.
13 4Supra, n. 36.
'Supra, n. 35, at p. 658.
136Supra, n. 36; see this statement answered by Brown, J., in Lent v. N. Y. Ry.
Co., supra, n. 53.
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Which of these two views, as a matter of legal analysis, is correct?
If we accept the view of the New York court that in every cause of
action a breach must be alleged, that the breach is material, even tho
not always placed in issue by a general denial, then we create an ex-
ception to the general rule that a general denial puts in issue all the
material allegations of the complaint. On the other hand, if we
accept the Wisconsin court's view, that since a general denial does not
put nonpayment in issue, it need not be alleged, we create an ex-
ception to the rule that a breach must be stated in every action.
As a matter of logic, the Wisconsin view seems the more tenable of
the two, because in harmony with the rules of pleading that whatever
facts are essential to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to recover must
be alleged in the complaint, and that what the plaintiff alleges he
must prove. The New York view, it will be noted, violates the second
of these rules, requiring the allegation of nonpayment, but not re-
quiring its proof at the trial. But despite the fact that the Wis-
consin view is more in line with the rules of pleading, it seems the
worse of the two evils, for as Brown, J.,17 points out, to hold with the
Wisconsin court would be to violate "The whole spirit of the Code".
Then, too, the exception established by the Wisconsin rule would be
much wider in its application and scope, as it would cover all actions,
whereas the exception established by the New York rule would
merely operate to narrow the scope of the general denial when
applied to one particular situation, that is, a plea of payment.
In conclusion, perhaps it may be said:
i. That in an action on acontractfor the payment of money,
nonpayment, its breach, must be alleged.
2. A general denial of such a breath ought to operate to put
payment in issue.
3. Altho the New York view that nonpayment must be
alleged, even tho not in issue under a general denial, is
illogical when contrasted to the Wisconsin view, it is
sounder in policy, as it better protects the rights and
interests of the litigant, it being impossible, under this
view, for the clerk, ona complaint, unverified and to which
there is no answer, to enter a judgment, unless the com-
plaint contains an allegation of nonpayment or breach.
SITUATION NUMBER THR E
Is Payment New Matter which Necessitates a Reply?
The next issue is this: Does the plea of payment constitute new
matter so as to necessitate a reply? Before attempting an answer to
this question, it should be observed that "The Codes of the several
137.Ud.
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states do not agree as to the necessity for a reply. In a few states, no
reply is required or permitted; in some, none is required except to a
counterclaim or set-off; and in some, a reply is required when the de-
fense of new matter is to be met by matter in avoidance; while,
in others, all new matter in the answer, whether by way of defense or
by way of cross-demand, must be replied to, either by denial or by
new matter in avoidance."' 38  From this statement, the conclusion
is obvious that the problem as to whether payment is new matter so
as to necessitate a reply will, in large measure, depend upon the nature
of the statute under which the question is decided.
But among the various views which prevail, there are at least two of
special interest, which are apparently opposed in principle. The
first view is that payment constitutes new matter which necessitates a
reply, and is perhaps, well represented by the case of Benecia Agri-
culture Works v. Creighton,'39 decided under a statute which provided
that "If the answer contains a statement of new matter, consti-
tuting a defense or counterclaim, and the plaintiff fail to reply or
demur thereto, within the time prescribed by law, the defendant may
move the court for such judgment as he is entitled to on the plead-
ings."' 40 The plaintiff sued for goods sold and delivered. Defendant,
in his answer, alleged an accounting, that $55.00 was found to be due,
and that he paid the same. These allegations were not denied in the
reply. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, whereupon the de-
fendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
motion was overruled. On appeal, the decision of the lower court was
reversed, the upper court holding that since the plea of payment was
not denied by the reply it must be taken as true. This amounted to
saying that in Oregon payment was new matter which necessitated a
reply in order to prevent it from standing admitted on the pleadings.
In Hubler v. Pullen'4 plaintiff sued the defendant on a bill of ex-
change. Among other defenses, the defendant set up payment,
to which particular plea there was no reply. The court held that
since there was no reply to the plea of payment, "There was in effect,
a trial without an issue, which has often been adjudged erroneous."
This case was decided under a statute which provided that "All
defenses except the mere denial of the facts alleged by the plaintiff,
should be specially pleaded."'1' Construing this statute, the court
said:14
1aSPhillips on Code Pleading,[se.,267.
239Supra, n. 4.
14°Hill's Code (Ore.), sec. 78.
UlSupra, n. 37.
l42See the provision of the statute, supra, n. 57.
'1'At p. 275.
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"This evidently means facts which the plaintiff, to sustain his
action, is bound to prove. The complaint, it is true, ordinarily
avers that the instrument sued on has not been paid; still, proof
of that averment is not required, and therefore, it is not put in
issue by a general denial."
It will be noticed that this result in Indiana was attained without
the aid of a statutory provision to the effect that if new matter is
not replied to it will stand admitted, as was the case in the Oregon
decision.
The second and opposite view is that payment is not new matter
as to necessitate a reply, and is illustrated by the case of Van Giesen
v. Van Giesen,'" decided under a similar statut 45 and on the same
state of facts. The court held that "Under the Code of 1848, a com-
plete issue was made by an averment in the complaint of nonpay-
ment, and the allegation of payment in the answer; such allegation is
not new matter, and no reply is necessary to prevent it standing
admitted." Observe that altho New York and Indiana are alike in
that both hold that nonpayment must be alleged, even if proof of the
allegation is not required,48 New York holds in this case that no re-
ply is necessary because payment is not new matter, clearly im-
plying that a reply would be necessary, if it regarded payment as new
matter. The difference, therefore, is not one of principle, as it appears
on the surface, but it is one as to whether the plea of payment in
that particular situation is new matter, Indiana holding that it is,
New York holding that it is not. To state the same thing in another
form, in New York, a plea of payment to an action for a debt has
been held to be a traverse, whereas, in Indiana, a special plea of pay-
ment is not treated as a traverse, but as an affirmative plea. If, as a
matter of substantive law the courts of these two states agreed that
the plea of payment was always an affirmative defense, both would
require a reply to such a plea to prevent the same from standing
admitted. It should be noted that the result in New York would be
the product of an express statutory provision, whereas in Indiana it
would be the product of judicial decision. It should also be ob-
served that in Indiana the courts apparently regard payment as new
matter, irrespective of the character of the plaintiff's allegations.
This is an arbitrary rule, and it is submitted that the New York view,
which leaves the court free to give some regard to the character and
form of the allegations, is less apt to lead into difficulty.
1"Supra, n. 38.
m'Sec. 13 of the New York Code of 1848 provided: "When the answer con-
tains new matter constituting a defense or counter-claim, the plaintiff may reply
to such new matter, denying particularly each allegation controverted by hima."
145Hubler v. Pullen, supra, n. 37; Lerche v. Brasher, 104 N. Y. 157 (1887).
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Another case holding that a special plea of payment is a traverse is
the case of Frish v. Caler,47 which was also a suit on a promissory
note, decided under a similar statute. Indeed, the argument in
favor of the view that payment is not new matter which necessitates a
reply is most ably presented by Cope, J., when he says:148
"Whether matter is new or not, must be determined by the matter
itself, and not by the form in which it is pleaded-the test being
whether it operates as a traverse or by way of confession and avoid-
ance. A plea tendering no new issue, but controverting the
original cause of action, is a mere traverse, and as nothing new
is involved in it, to call it new matter would be a misapplica-
tion of terms. It is not essential to a traverse that it be expressed
in negative words-the form of the plea depending upon the alle-
gation it is intended to meet; a negative allegation requiring an
affirmative plea, and vice versa. An averment that a debt has
not been paid, followed by a plea of payment, makes an issue
upon the point, and a replication would only amount to a reiter-
ation of the negative already expressed."
On principle, the New York and California view, as represented by
Van Giesen v. Van Giesen,149 and Frish v. Caler,'50 seem preferable to
the view expressed in the Oregon and Indiana cases, in that they
seem to hold that "Matter, whether it is new or not, must be de-
termined by the matter itself", thus leaving some leeway for the
courts to give some attention to the substantive character of the
various allegations, rather than to be bound by the mere form of the
pleadings. In Indiana, at least, the courts seem to lay more empha-
sis upon the form than upon the substantive character of the various
allegations, as they hold that a special plea of payment, which in
Van Giesen v. Van Giesen'5' was held to be a specific traverse, is not a
specific traverse, but an affirmative plea. That is, in Indiana, the
statute is so construed as to make all pleas of payment affirmative
pleas, whether the language of the pleadings would logically lead to
another conclusion or not.
On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile the result secured in
Van Giesen v. Van Qiesen5 2 with that obtained in McKyring v.
Bull.1'3 Concerning the Van Giesen case, Selden, J., said:
"That case simply decided that where the complaint con-
tained an averment of nonpayment, a plea of payment form-
ed a complete issue."
'
47Supra, n. 38.
148At P. 75.
l49Supra, n. 38.15ofbd.
1
"Ibid.
ISpabid.
m
5 Snpra, n. 7.
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Stated conservatively, lawyers and judges have not been entirely
satisfied with the hurried distinction here drawn between the two
cases, because if nonpayment could be put in issue by a specific
traverse, as is expressly held in Van Giesen v. Van Giesen,'1 why, in
McKyring v. Bull,65 could it not be put in issue by a general traverse
or denial?
In conclusion, probably the most that can be said is this: In
states which regard the statutory provisions as absolutely binding,
and which adhere strictly to the form of a plea, rather than to its
content or substance, payment will be held to constitute new matter
which necessitates a reply; but in states which are not so bound by
their statutory provisions as to leave out of consideration the charac-
ter and content of the allegations, payment will be considered not as
new matter which necessitates a reply.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, perhaps the following conclusions may be
drawn:
i. That the usual statement of the general rule, without quali-
fication, that payment is an affirmative defense which cannot be re-
lied upon unless specially pleaded and which cannot be shown under
the general denial, is neither strictly accurate nor helpful.
2. That in a strict and accurate sense, there is no general rule.
But if one must be stated, probably the most that can be said is this:
Granted a case wherein the allegation of nonpayment is an essential
element in the complaint, a general denial puts payment in issue, and
hence payment is not new matter to be specially pleaded; but granted
a case wherein the allegation of nonpayment is not an essential ele-
ment in the complaint, a general denial does not put payment in
issue, and hence payment is new matter which must be specially
pleaded.
3. That the problem of pleading would be simplified by a rule
that nonpayment, the breach, should be alleged and proved in all
contract actions for the payment of money; for to hold that a general
denial does not put the allegation of nonpayment in issue is to create
an exception to the rule that a general denial puts in issue all the
material allegations of the complaint; whereas, to hold with the
minority view, that nonpayment need not be alleged since it is not
placed in issue by the general denial, is to create an exception to the
rule that in every action a breach must be alleged-a much more
'"Supra, n. 38.
' Supra, n. 7.
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dangerous exception than the one narrowing the scope of the general
denial in a particular situation, as has been pointed out.
4. That "The proper way to plead payment, whether by way of
confession and avoidance, or by way of traverse, is to assert it affirm-
atively. But under the rule that the denial of a negative aver-
ment is a defect in form, and not of substance, it might not be error,
tho a practice not to be tolerated, to admit evidence of payment, un-
der a denial of alleged nonpayment."' 56
5. That the difficulties encountered in suits for an existing bal-
ance, and in suits wherein the indebtedness is merely alleged in
general terms, could be largely eliminated by a strict requirement
that facts and not conclusions should be stated; that in any event,
when suing on a balance on an open account, it is always advisable for
the plaintiff, to sue on the account as it was originally and omit any
allegation as to the amount the defendant has paid, thus leaving the
same to be pleaded as a defense by the defendant.
6. That altho the conclusions stated may be logically correct, and
that the so-called general rule that payment is an affirmative defense
presents an anomaly, there seems to be an under current of feeling
running thru the decisions, unexpressed, it is true, but evident from a
constant striving on the part of the courts to make every case fit into
the general rule, that probably the rule, as it stands, presents the best
solution of a difficult problem. As pointed out, to require the plain-
tiff, not only to allege but also to prove the negative averment of
nonpayment, is to require the proof of a negative, which is looked
upon with little favor by the courts. On the other hand, if the de-
fendant has paid, practically speaking, it places no great burden on
him to plead and prove payment as a defense. So, despite the an-
omaly connected with the plea of payment as an affirmative de-
fense, probably the rule should be retained as amatterof soundpolicy.
156Supra, n. 2.
